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Simon Bulmer and Martin Burch 
 
 
The adaptation of UK government to European integration has been a long-term process. 
It can be dated back to the 1961 application by the Conservative government under 
Harold Macmillan to join the European Communities. The process developed in earnest 
after the UK's accession in 1973. However, accession was not a "big-bang" event, since 
adjustment had begun before accession, and the EU of today has developed massively 
compared to the European Communities (EC) of 1973. The process since 1973 was an 
incremental one characterised by a broadening of policy coverage and increasing 
institutional density at European level. Occasional high-profile debates, such as those at 
the time of the 1975 UK referendum on continued membership or during the ratification 
of the Maastricht Treaty, highlighted the importance of the European issue. However, 
away from these periods of wider public attention, the impact of integration upon UK 
government and the policy process developed incrementally in a relatively unseen 
manner. The cumulative effect of these changes, however, amounted to a substantial and 
significant alteration in the pattern of UK government and policy-making. Thus, over 
time a transformation of British government took place that could be regarded as a quiet 
revolution.  
 
The election of the Blair government in 1997, and its re-election with a second landslide 
majority in 2001, brought the process of "adapting to Europe" sharply into focus for three 
key reasons. First, Blair's 1997 manifesto contained a commitment to conducting a 
constructive policy within the European Union (EU). Blair wished to bring about a "step-
change" in the UK's relationship with its EU partners. Secondly, it also included reforms 
to institutions in Westminster and Whitehall that would bear upon the domestic pattern of 
EU policy-making. Thirdly, his programme of devolving power to authorities in 
Scotland, Wales, Northern Ireland and London represented a major departure from the 
predominantly centralised machinery of government that had structured the UK's 
diplomatic and administrative response to EU membership theretofore. Legislation for 
English regional devolution has been introduced in Blair's second term, and is likely to 
reinforce this new direction. If these developments are not sufficient to contend with, the 
separate ones under way at supranational level mean that UK adaptation is taking place 
within a fluid EU context: ratification of the 1997 Amsterdam Treaty; agreement on the 
Nice Treaty; the introduction of the euro in 2002 (but not in the UK); enlargement of the 
EU in May 2004 to accommodate 10 new member states; and a constitutional convention 
(in 2002-3) that was designed to pave the way for a fundamental overhaul of the EU's 
institutions to cope with a membership of 25 or more member states.  
 
In this paper we review - from a UK perspective - how the UK government and its policy 
process have adapted to European integration. Has adaptation been a quiet revolution, a 
step-change, or both? In exploring this puzzle we draw upon the conceptual literature of 
Europeanisation. We employ it to shed light on the longer-term pattern of UK adaptation  3 
as well as to put into context the domestic changes currently under way. Although 
commentators frequently alight upon continued non-membership of the euro as an 
indicator of the UK's continued incomplete adaptation to integration, we argue that there 
is a step-change under way in the Europeanisation of UK EU policy making, though not 
necessarily in its outcomes.  
 
 
THE EUROPEANIZATION OF UK GOVERNMENT 
 
The literature on Europeanisation has been growing in recent times and is moving 
towards more explicit attempts both to define the concept and to set out research designs 
for exploring its empirical features (Börzel 1999; Risse, Cowles and Caporaso 2001; 
Radaelli 2000; Featherstone and Radaelli 2003; Knill 2001). At a general level 
Europeanisation concentrates on the impact of the EU upon the member states, something 
which might more accurately be defined as "EU-ization" (Wallace, 2001). Clearly, there 
are different component parts of the political system which are affected in this way: the 
polity, political forces, the political economy and policy content. In this paper we focus 
on the executive branch of government in the UK and indirectly the UK policy process. 
 
In focusing on the Europeanisation of the polity, i.e. of domestic governance structures, it 
is easier to isolate the causation flowing from the EU than is the case with policy studies. 
In the case of the latter Europeanisation in some instances may turn out not to be an 
independent variable at all. It may simply be mediating underlying developments with 
their origins in global economic transformation or be constructed discursively in order to 
make globalization more palatable domestically (see Hay and Rosamond 2002). But it is 
still not easy to isolate causation in the Europeanisation of the polity. One of the 
problems is the fact that the "object" - in this case UK executive government - has not 
been static. Indeed, over the period of nearly half a century that we are concerned with in 
this paper, there have been many changes that have been quite unrelated to Europe. 
Individual governments have reconstructed Whitehall ministries, direct rule was 
introduced in Northern Ireland, new public management techniques have been 
introduced, and reforms under Blair such as devolution: all of these have meant that it has 
been a shifting UK landscape that has been subject to a Europeanisation effect.  
 
This problem becomes particularly acute under the Blair government, since there have 
been three sets of development that are difficult to disentangle. First, the pace of reform 
and change within the EU has accelerated: so far two sets of treaty reform, another under 
way, plus the largest enlargement in the history of integration. Second, the Blair 
government has sought to increase its engagement with partner states in the EU. Third, 
domestically the constitution has been subject to multiple reforms. These encompass 
devolution to Scotland, Wales and, with intermittent suspensions, Northern Ireland; 
English devolution, including to the Greater London Authority; independence for the 
Bank of England; electoral reform (the use of proportional representation for certain 
elections, notably in devolved authorities and for the European Parliament); incorporation 
of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR); reform of the House of Lords; 
modernisation of the House of Commons; and the introduction of a Freedom of  4 
Information Act. Of these devolution resonates with the emergence of multi-level 
governance in the EU; the member states have been enjoined to introduce a common 
electoral system for European elections, Bank of England independence fulfilled a 
requirement for a later step to joining the euro, and the ECHR is a European construct, 
even if it falls under the Council of Europe in Strasbourg rather than being part of the EU 
itself. 
 
How does this problem of attributing causality tie in with contemporary frameworks for 
the analysis of Europeanisation? There is no absolute solution to this problem. 
Circumspection is needed so as not to attribute all change to Europeanisation. At the 
same time care needs to be taken with conceptual definition. Taking definitional issues 
first, we adapt a definition from Bulmer and Radaelli (2004 forthcoming) and understand 
Europeanisation as follows: 
Europeanisation consists of processes of a) construction, b) diffusion and c) 
institutionalisation of formal and informal rules, procedures, policy paradigms, 
styles, “ways of doing things” and shared beliefs and norms which are defined 
and consolidated in the EU policy process and incorporated in the logic of 
domestic (national and subnational) discourse, political structures and public 
policies.
2 
 
One view of Europeanisation associates domestic adjustment with some kind of "misfit" 
with the EU (see Börzel 1999; Risse, Cowles and Caporaso 2001). However, “misfit” 
does not represent a “necessary condition for domestic change” (Knill 2001: 13). For 
example, Héritier and Knill have found cases of domestic reforms taking place despite an 
absence of misfit (Héritier and Knill 2001). Haverland (2000) has drawn attention to the 
importance of institutional veto points in explaining the adjustment to adaptation 
pressures. According to his emphasis it is not just misfit but the presence/absence of veto 
points that explains the mechanisms of Europeanisation. These analytical observations 
suggest that Europeanisation is subtle and differentiated. Indeed, in terms of policy 
adaptation Bulmer and Radaelli (2004 forthcoming) have suggested that there are 
different “default” mechanisms of Europeanisation, depending on the mode of 
governance prevailing in the EU policy issue under the spotlight. 
 
Some of the above concerns are less relevant to the Europeanisation of the national polity 
as opposed to of national policy. Nevertheless, we find merit in the broad framework 
developed by Risse, Cowles and Caporaso (2001) and return to it shortly. Before doing 
so, we identify some analytical issues that will feature in the empirical part of the paper.  
 
First, although we are concerned with the top-down impact of the EU upon the member 
state, the definition used above identifies the explicitly interactive nature of 
Europeanisation. In other words, we recognise that there is an iterative process under 
way, not least because the adaptation of the UK governmental system is designed in part 
to ensure effective input into EU policy-making in Brussels. Thus we see adjustment to 
the EU as a process of aligning two institutional logics: that of the EU and that of UK 
governance. This adjustment process entails two separate steps. As a first and necessary 
stage domestic institutions must find suitable ways of processing EU business. The  5 
lowest adjustment cost is incurred by incorporating EU business into the pre-existing 
domestic logic of governance through some switching mechanism. However, domestic 
institutions must also adapt their procedures so as to be able to make an effective 
contribution to those EU dynamics. We term these two components of institutional 
response to Europeanisation "reception" and "projection" (Bulmer and Burch 2000 and 
2002). “Reception” involves a much larger part of UK government because so much of 
British policy has a European dimension. To take a concrete example, the Department for 
the Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (DEFRA) is subject to a wide range of EU 
policy: on the environment, food standards, agriculture and fisheries. But whilst a large 
part of the ministry’s organisation and officials is working within guidelines set by the 
EU, a rather smaller subset is engaged in the projection side, i.e. formulating UK input 
into proposed legislation or other decisions. Looking at the impact of the EU more 
broadly, it is worth drawing attention to a study conducted by Ed Page (1998). In an 
analysis of UK Statutory Instruments (SIs) over the period 1987-97 he found that 15.8 
per cent could be traced to European legislation.
3 Page concluded that this figure was still 
a relatively modest proportion, although it displayed considerable variation; 51.3 per cent 
of SIs issued by the (then) Ministry of Agriculture Fisheries and Food (MAFF) could be 
traced to EU legislation. 
 
Page was concerned with Europeanisation as “reception”. We argue that “reception” is a 
first response to Europeanisation. It is a prior step to the “projection” response. 
“Projection” refers to the development of machinery for securing an effective voice in the 
formulation of policy in Brussels. It means learning the rules of the game in Brussels, and 
they may be different from those in the domestic political system. 
 
A third response to Europeanisation is to regard it as an opportunity structure for 
resolving domestic policy problems that are perceived not to be properly resolved within 
a national context, e.g. because their scale goes beyond that of the nation state. This third 
response involves making systematic use of the “projection” response in order to make an 
imprint on the activities of the EU.  
 
Whilst this paper is concerned with "political structures" we should note that they are 
bound up with other aspects of Europeanisation mentioned in the definition. The party-
political sensitivity of European policy for much of the period since 1973, such as over 
the issue of sovereignty, has had an impact upon the ability of UK policy-makers to 
utilise the EU as an opportunity structure. UK discourse surrounding European 
integration – whether articulated in a rather sceptical print media (Wring in Baker and 
Seawright 1998) or in the parliamentary arena – has scarcely helped the active 
engagement with the EU that is implied in the third response outlined above. 
 
How, then, do we summarise our understanding of Europeanisation and domestic 
institutional change? We set this out in Figure 1, which adapts the work of Risse, Cowles 
and Caporaso (2001). In this simple model adaptation pressure derives from the EU level 
and prompts adjustment of domestic institutional design. Domestic institutions, together 
with the cultures and norms within them, are important mediators of adaptation pressure. 
Their stickiness in responding to change is well understood in the term "path- 6 
dependency" (Pierson 1996). Institutional veto points may inhibit change, although the 
UK political system is generally regarded as less subject to them than the more pluralist 
patterns of, say, Germany. Entrenched political beliefs and/or institutional cultures may 
also form barriers to adaptation. However, the importance of agency is also recognised: 
that is, actors responding to the domestic institutional context. These actors may as easily 
seize the opportunity offered by EU pressures to effect domestic structural changes. 
Exceptions to path-dependency do occur. In any event, the dependent variable of the 
model of adaptation is domestic institutional change.  
 
(SEE FIGURE 1) 
 
In what follows we examine how UK central government has adapted to pressures 
emanating from European integration in the period up to 1997. We then explore the 
record of adaptation under Blair. In exploring these two phases we use the categories set 
out in Figure 1. Our explanation therefore zeroes in on the institutional mediating factors 
at domestic level.  
•  Changes in formal authority and institutional veto points. How far has European 
integration brought about changes such as these? 
•  Changes in institutional opportunity structures, especially in information-sharing, 
policy-making and decision-taking networks (which may be expected to vary across 
policy areas). What new opportunity structures have been opened up by the EU for 
UK government? 
•  Changes in political and organisational cultures. Has Europeanisation led to change in 
the political and organisational cultures of UK government? 
•  Changes in key actors and the responses of existing political actors in exploiting the 
new institutional environment. How have political actors sought to exploit the UK’s 
Europeanisation? 
 
 
THE ADAPTATION OF UK GOVERNMENT - THE STORY PRIOR TO 1997 
 
UK government commenced its response to Europeanisation ahead of accession in 1973. 
Indeed, as has been argued elsewhere, the broad framework of the response emerged at 
the time of the negotiations for entry in 1961 (Bulmer and Burch 1998: 608-9). The basic 
principles of the response were wholly in keeping with traditional ways of working in 
Whitehall. They comprised the following key features: 
•  delegating the detailed consideration of substantive policy to the relevant UK 
ministry; 
•  assigning diplomatic functions to the Foreign Office; 
•  identifying the important legal dimension to integration, and placing it under the 
authority of the Treasury Solicitor’s Office; 
•  ensuring that policy was co-ordinated effectively within Whitehall through 
reliance on traditional cabinet mechanisms (a Cabinet committee underpinned by 
committees of officials); and 
•  the emergence of a set of core ministries at the heart of Europeanisation, with an 
outer tier having more intermittent involvement.  7 
 
The core ministries 
With accession in 1973 the core group of ministries was clear. This group comprised 
those ministries which had to respond to the policy impacts of Europeanisation as well as 
by participating in the formulation of the UK government’s input into the EC. A review 
of possible co-ordination options during 1971 had considered options, including the 
highly centralised French system of co-ordination (the SGCI) based around the French 
prime minister’s office as well as the possibility of a Ministry for Europe (see Wallace 
and Wallace 1973: 254). The three key departments – the Foreign and Commonwealth 
Office (FCO), the Cabinet Office and the Treasury seemed to reach agreement relatively 
easily. At the political level Prime Minister Edward Heath took the view that there should 
not be a Ministry for Europe but, rather, departments should think and act European and 
set up machinery to that end (Bulmer and Burch 1998: 612). 
 
At the time of accession the principal ministries affected by substantive EU policy were 
MAFF, the Treasury, the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI), the FCO and Customs 
and Excise. Legal advisors in the Treasury Solicitor’s Department oversaw the 
transposition of EC legislation across Whitehall. This centralised function was designed 
to ensure that departments undertook their duties to transpose EC legislation. Regarded as 
a being a branch of the Cabinet Office – complete with an official-level cabinet 
committee to oversee matters – this arrangement explains why adapting to Europe has 
involved a good UK record at transposing European legislation despite the party-political 
trials and tribulations associated with integration. 
 
The co-ordination of European policy-making – i.e. “projection” of policy in Brussels – 
as well as a measure of general oversight was achieved through a small central secretariat 
in the Cabinet Office (the European Secretariat). Its three or four top personnel plus legal 
advisers along with key players in the Prime Minister’s Office (PMO) and Foreign and 
Commonwealth Office (FCO) and the UK’s Permanent Representative to the European 
Communities formed the hub of the government’s European policy making network. 
These personnel, both ministerial and official, plus one or two others from the Treasury 
and the two Departments most consistently and substantially involved in European 
matters, dealing with agriculture and trade and industry, formed the inner core of the 
network. Formally speaking co-ordination was achieved through a tiered system of 
cabinet committees at both ministerial and official levels. This co-ordinating net stretched 
out into Brussels through the UK Permanent Representation to the EU (UKRep), and 
engaged as the need arose, depending on the nature of the issue, personnel in other 
domestic Departments. At first, other than those Departments already mentioned, very 
few others were involved.  
 
This structure and approach to handling European business was adapted over the period 
from 1973 largely to take into account the development of EC/EU competencies and the 
consequent growth of business and the spread of the network to include all central 
government Departments. However, the principles and the broad framework of operation 
did not change despite the considerable expansion in EU-related activity. It was simply 
that new European policies, such as on the environment (see Jordan 2002), necessitated  8 
the involvement of a widening group of Whitehall officials and ministers in the putting 
into effect, and shaping, of European policy. The 1993 Maastricht Treaty, with its 
creation of a “third pillar” to co-ordinate policy on justice and home affairs, had a similar 
effect. The Home Office joined the group of key players even though the Conservative 
Government made every effort to resist the Europeanisation of these policy areas. New 
recruits to “the core” were a function of the development of new policy activities at EU 
level. Perhaps the most significant of these recruits was the prime minister: this as a result 
of the inauguration of regular summit meetings (the European Council) in 1975. Key 
players at ministerial level are thus the Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary, the latter 
having the lead on EU institutional matters and the chair of the cabinet’s ministerial 
committee on European issues. 
 
How can we come to grips with the changes under way in the core departments, drawing 
upon the Europeanisation framework that was outlined earlier? A question worth posing 
at the outset is whether there was any “misfit” between the structure and patterns of UK 
government and that of the EC/EU. Offering an answer is rather more difficult. There 
were certainly numerous aspects of supranational governance that did not sit well with 
British traditions.  
•  The emergent multi-levelled nature of the EU, with its characteristic sharing of 
power across tiers, contrasted with the UK’s centralised system, where the EU’s 
gain was seen as the UK government’s loss.  
•  The need for alliance building amongst EU governments in the Council contrasted 
with the majoritarian UK electoral system, where the winner was accustomed to 
taking all (unless holding only a slender majority in the House of Commons).  
•  The supremacy of EC law and the possibilities of using qualified majority voting 
in the Council presented challenges to the UK parliament, with its entrenched 
notions of sovereignty.  
•  The roman law of the EU differed from the English common law system.  
•  The legal-regulatory pattern of the EU differed from the UK’s tradition of self-
regulation.  
•  The diffuse network-based pattern of EU governance clashed with the more 
centralised UK cabinet system.  
•  The emergent tradition in the EU of having recurrent episodes of institutional 
reform contrasted with the UK’s lack of a domestic constitution and a more 
pragmatic approach to developing structures of governance according to need 
rather than grand principles.  
This (doubtless incomplete) list would suggest quite a measure of systemic misfit. It 
certainly contrasts with the greater measure of congruence between the German and EU 
systems that may, along with other factors, have helped the Federal Republic to enjoy 
more positive experiences than the UK in its engagement with the EU.
4 And yet 
relatively few steps were undertaken to bring the UK into closer alignment with the ways 
of doing things in the EU. The key point here was that there was no specific requirement 
from the EU that stipulated the development of a better “fit” on the part of domestic 
institutions. Indeed, any such requirement would have been regarded – in the UK and 
other member states – as an intrusion into sovereign domestic matters. 
  9 
To summarise, there was misfit between the two systems of governance but the need to 
align was not explicit in the way that often obtains in the Europeanisation of certain 
policy areas through a duty on the part of member states to transpose EU legislation. How 
far can this lack of domestic adaptation be attributable to institutional mediating factors at 
the UK level? 
 
Institutional veto points go a long way to explain the very limited institutional 
adaptation at domestic level. The UK’s centralised system of government, majoritarian 
rule, parliamentary sovereignty, cabinet system, different constitutional traditions and so 
on: all represented fundamental traditions in the political system. Why should the UK 
adjust these features, particularly when the Heath Government had played down the 
consequences for them of acceding to the EU? If suitable “switching mechanisms” could 
be found, whereby the adaptation pressures of the EU could simply be accommodated 
with existing UK governmental structures, why would domestic institutional adaptation 
be needed at all? In many ways this is precisely what occurred over the first two decades 
of UK membership. And this approach was bolstered by the recurrent arguments about 
European integration within and between the main political parties. This background 
scarcely provided a climate appropriate to reducing misfits with the EU through changes 
to the long-standing constitutional patterns of the UK.  
 
For quite separate domestic reasons some of the misfits were arguably reinforced. Three 
examples will suffice: 
•  The Thatcher Government abolished the metropolitan counties in England and 
created a more centralised system of territorial power than beforehand. Only with 
the creation under the Major Government of the government offices in the regions 
was a small step taken towards the more multi-levelled system encouraged by the 
EU. 
•  The Thatcher Government also strengthened the Treasury’s control over public 
expenditure. In line with the shift from expenditure planning to an expenditure-
control system (see Thain and Wright 1995) a system known as EUROPES was 
introduced from 1988 to ensure that Whitehall ministries could not subvert the 
domestic system of control by gaining additional resources from EU funds. The 
EUROPES system created a default situation whereby the resources obtained by a 
department from Brussels would simply be deducted from the domestic 
departmental settlement. Given the greater administrative simplicity of managing 
purely domestic programmes, EUROPES had the effect of getting spending 
ministries behind the Treasury’s objective of limiting the size of the EU budget 
(Bulmer and Burch 1998: 618-9). Departments were given an incentive not to 
engage positively with EU policies that involved spending from the supranational 
budget.  
•  A third example relates to the Europeanisation of civil service career structures. 
Although a cadre of officials and diplomats with considerable experience of the 
EU was beginning to emerge, some home civil servants found the attractions of a 
posting in Brussels limited. The management de-layering that many departments 
underwent in the 1980s created career uncertainty and a preference to be at 
“headquarters” rather than face an uncertain re-entry after an EU posting. In this  10 
case it was central government’s embracing of changes associated with the new 
public management that was responsible. 
 
In each of the above illustrations developments quite separate from European integration 
had the effect of blocking or exacerbating institutional adaptation to the EU. However, 
the predominant picture is not one of veto points blocking institutional adaptation to the 
EU but of small adjustments, designed to “translate” EU needs into compatibility with the 
existing traditions of UK central government. Thus the handling of EU policy conforms 
to the basic tenets of the UK state system. This has traditionally been highly centralised 
and metropolitan with primary and substantial power being placed in the hands of central 
government in London. Within central government, formally speaking, authority is 
collective and located within cabinet and its ministerial committees, though in practice 
authority is both more concentrated and more dispersed than the formal account allows. It 
all depends on the nature of the issue. Core actors, including the PM and his staff, enjoy 
substantial authority on issues of high policy or on issues that cannot be settled within or 
between Departments. Departments and their personnel also enjoy considerable authority 
in that they lead on policy in their area of responsibility and matters are often settled 
inside the Department or between the relevant Departments without engaging the wider 
cabinet system (for a full outline of the nature and origins of the modern cabinet system 
see Burch and Holliday 1996; Smith 1999). 
 
Over the period since entry, the European co-ordinating machinery for “projection” has 
operated as a filter on policy and if necessary a means whereby a particular Departmental 
line could be knocked into shape prior to the business being handled in the EU. It has 
provided opportunities to intervene in order to ensure that the UK holds back or has an 
agreed negotiating line. This has been achieved either through the formal structure of 
committees or more directly through personal contacts by high ranking officials or even 
by the Prime Minister or Foreign Secretary at ministerial level. An example of this ability 
to intercede and sort things out is provided by the regular Friday meeting which takes 
place in the Cabinet Office under the chair of the Head of the European Secretariat, with 
the UK’s Permanent Representative in attendance along with senior officials from the 
FCO and the Treasury and officials from the Departments whose business is being 
discussed. The Friday meeting reviews business coming up in the EU in the weeks ahead 
and the UK line to be pursued. It was certainly used in the early days of membership to 
bring errant Departments into line. Through such mechanisms the UK has tried to ensure 
that it is well prepared and “speaks with one voice” in EU fora. 
 
Formally speaking it is ministers, either collectively through cabinet and its committees 
or individually through their own Departments, who have final authority but officials are 
highly influential both in shaping and, on occasions, determining policy. Accordingly a 
key domestic factor that has limited the development of European policy has been party 
politics. Indeed a central feature in the development of UK European policy is that a 
relatively efficient, well co-ordinated and smoothly run state machine has throughout 
been constrained in the actual development and delivery of policy by problems thrown up 
in the party political sphere. Both before and throughout EC/EU membership Europe has 
been a source of division in and between the parties (Young 2000). This has greatly  11 
constrained the activities of ministers especially when the governing party had a small 
parliamentary majority, as in the case of the second Major administration (1992-97).  
 
Compared with institutional veto points and legacies, opportunity structures have not 
featured greatly. One important possibility that may be used is for the prime minister to 
avail him/herself of the opportunities afforded by the European Council to advocate a 
European policy solution to a domestic problem. In fact this opportunity was little used. 
However, one clear occasion came in the mid-1980s, when Mrs Thatcher was able to get 
the single market programme approved by the member states as part of a package that 
included institutional reform in the Single European Act. A rather different kind of 
adaptation through exploiting opportunity structures came about with the UK 
government’s decision to set up a European Staffing Unit in the Office of Public Service. 
The function of this Unit was to encourage the recruitment and training of young 
graduates into a fast-stream cadre that would take up postings in Brussels. The motivation 
was that it was important to have a set of able UK officials in the Commission and 
elsewhere – as distinct from national officials on secondments. 
 
Political actors more widely have availed themselves of new opportunities, but these 
have typically involved circumventing the UK government to try to obtain better political 
outcomes. Environmentalist groups, for instance, have taken up their cases in Brussels on 
whether the UK government had carried out proper environmental impact assessment 
(Jordan 2002: 181). Large firms have also taken their lobbying direct to Brussels 
(Fairbrass 2003). However, developments such as these have not led to institutional 
adaptation on the part of UK central government. 
 
What of political and organisational cultures? The UK approach to handling European 
business is imbued with certain principles derived from the political and organisational 
cultures of UK central government. Significant amongst these is the notion of 
departmental lead on policy, coupled with light monitoring and co-ordination from the 
centre. The understandings essential to ensuring this system works effectively are those 
based on an organisational culture of reciprocity and trust. The key practices are those of 
sharing information and involvement across departments and of informing the centre 
(that is, in the case of Europe, the Cabinet Office European Secretariat) of matters that 
are likely to concern it. These practices ensure both a measure of central oversight and 
the involvement of all those within central government that need to be drawn into 
discussions. They are backed up by norms of collective decision-making, expressed 
through conventions such as that of collective responsibility. Overall these principles 
have contributed to a tendency in the making of European policy to seek agreement “in-
house” in keeping with the consensus across central government. In addition to 
organisational values, European policy has also been shaped by a general political elite 
culture of caution when it comes to the public discussion of European issues. Given that 
Europe has often proved to be divisive, the issue has always posed political management 
problems for UK governing elites. One response has been to try to keep the issue out of 
the forefront of public debate which has resulted in a failure of successive governments to 
address public unease about European policy. The pattern, therefore, has been one of 
adapting existing ways of doing things rather than major adaptation.  12 
 
The outer circle of policy-makers 
Departments outside the core group have been involved in European business in a less 
intensive manner. Departments responsible for policy areas such as employment, 
education, social security and the like have been affected by EU policy, to be sure. 
However, whilst they may have quite important duties to adhere to in respect of EU 
legislation, they are outliers in terms of “projecting” policy into the Brussels arena. Their 
participation in the EU policy-making machinery is very much on an “as needed” basis. 
The so-called territorial departments, which provided central government’s presence in 
Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland, were each also gradually drawn into the European 
policy-making network. Their ability to play a significant role was very limited because 
they were too small in resource terms, too far from the centre, and sometimes neglected. 
However, they became increasingly active and more assertive in this area of policy from 
the early 1990s: the Scottish Office in particular (Smith 2001). The government offices in 
the English regions, set up under the Major government, also became drawn into EU 
policy (see Burch and Gomez 2002 and 2003). From the point of view of our analytical 
framework, the picture is very much as for that with “the core”. 
 
Summary 
The adaptation of UK central government to integration over the period up to 1997 was 
principally one of absorbing EU business into the practices established domestically over 
the last decades. The British constitution, unwritten though it may be, served as a kind of 
veto point to any adjustment pressures emanating from Brussels. The deadweight of 
history was supported by an institutional culture that was satisfied with the 
Whitehall/Westminster machinery. Moreover, given that UK membership had been sold 
by Edward Heath as having negligible impact on sovereignty, any idea that traditions of 
British institutions needed alteration would have created an outcry. The fragile support 
for integration meant that the new institutional opportunity structures that were afforded 
by engagement in integration were utilised in a very limited manner. Interest groups and 
large corporations, however, recognised the new realities and sought direct engagement 
in Brussels to go alongside their established pattern of lobbying in Whitehall. In short, 
institutional adjustment was limited. But it was widespread. By 1997 every Department 
had been obliged to invest resources into the monitoring of EU activity. Even Michael 
Portillo, one of the more Euro-sceptic ministers in the Major Government, found himself 
unable to escape Europeanisation. As Secretary of State for Defence his Department, as 
one of the largest landowners, had to contend with EU environmental legislation. 
Moreover, with civilian personnel employed at military bases in Germany, it found that 
the Social Chapter of the Maastricht Treaty applied to its activities despite the 
Conservative Government’s opt-out.
5 It was through the many impacts such as these that 
the business of UK central government may be seen to have undergone a quiet revolution 
as a result of the EU’s impact. But the response to Europeanisation was primarily 
“reception” then “projection”. The utilisation of the EU as an opportunity structure for 
pursuing British policy goals had only been attempted in respect of the single market 
programme. 
 
  13 
THE ADAPTATION OF UK GOVERNMENT - POST 1997 
 
The Blair government has built on established trends in UK/EU policy handling, but it 
has also set up new structures and processes, which potentially shift the field on which 
European policy is played out at the domestic level. While these changes have not yet led 
to significant alterations in outcomes, they have the potential to do so. In general there 
has been an enhancement of the projection capabilities of UK government and an attempt 
to get away from a passive and reactive approach to the reception of EU initiatives. More 
staff and resources, especially at the core, have been devoted to European policy making. 
In addition there has been an attempt to change the attitude toward the benefits and 
potentials of the EU project and to mainstream Europe in the activities of all departments. 
There have also been important changes in the structure of the state, which have required 
some alteration in the ways in which European policy is made and implemented.  
 
The core ministries 
So far as formal authority and institutional veto points are concerned there has been a 
significant centralising of EU policy handling at the heart of the core of UK/EU policy 
process.  
 
Labour in office has benefited from a more benign attitude towards Europe on the part of 
the governing party than had been the case with their Conservative predecessors. 
Labour’s coming to terms with Europe while in Opposition has allowed them to develop 
a more up-front, strategic and positive approach to Europe. In order to achieve this more 
resources and powers of direction have been given to the Centre of the core. In effect 
there has been a streamlining of effort at the very top through integrating more closely 
the work of the COES and No 10. The secretariat has, as from August 2000, been 
substantially augmented. Its personnel have increased from 9 senior officials to 16 – with 
four senior staff and 12 desk officers. Its status has been raised through the appointment 
of Sir Stephen Wall as head of the Secretariat, with the position of Permanent Secretary, 
and the title of Prime Minister’s Adviser on Europe with an office in No10. This has been 
further complemented by closer connections between the Secretariat and members of the 
Prime Minister’s Policy Unit (PMPU). These connections involve not just the designated 
EU desk officer in No 10 – Roger Liddle – but others in PMPU who are drawn in not 
only when their area of specialism has a EU dimension, but also may take part in 
discussions on the more general aspects of EU policy. The effect of this enhancement of 
the core has been to give a more executive thrust to policy making and to open up the 
opportunity for a more directive and strategic approach to European policy making at the 
very top. It has enhanced the position of the PM and his aides in European policy making.  
 
This more centralised and directive approach to EU policy making in part reflects the 
style of the Blair administration, but it also reflects longer-term trends towards enhancing 
the centre of the core which can be traced back to the Callaghan administration (Burch 
and Holliday 1996). In addition there is a direct EU effect at work here in that there has 
been increasing requirement for more involvement by heads of government in EU policy 
making. What the Blair government has done is to build on established trends and to  14 
significantly extend them. The effect has been to allow for a more centrally focussed and 
co-ordinated approach to policy making on EU policy in general.  
 
While European policy making is more focussed on the executive and directed from it, 
there are areas where the re-mit of the Centre is not so tight. A particular feature of the 
Blair government is the way that executive authority is split between the PM and staff, on 
the one hand and the Chancellor of the Exchequer and the Treasury on the other. This 
fault line is one of the central features of the Blair government (Naughtie 2001) and it has 
had a particular consequence for the economic aspects of European policy. The Treasury 
still has a somewhat negative effect on European issues through expenditure concerns: 
notably EUROPES is still in place. But it is in relation to monetary issues that the 
Treasury has had an impact on the adaptation of the UK to EU pressures through the 
development and evaluation of the five economic tests required before the government 
can recommend joining the euro zone. As under the Major government the Treasury has 
kept charge of the development of policy in relation to the European currency. This factor 
reflects an important division of authority within UK government and one that has 
arguably grown more restrictive in the period since 1997.        
 
Turning to changes in institutional opportunity structures, a characteristic feature of 
the Blair government’s approach has been a much more significant effort to realise the 
potential for affecting the inter-governmental forces and interests which shape EU 
policies and initiatives. The aim has been to condition the climate of debate surrounding 
the run-up to key EU decisions through greater contact and liaison at member state level, 
leading to exchanges of information, alliances on policy initiatives, and long-term 
coalition building. This approach was enshrined in the so-called “step change” 
programme from which much else has followed. It grew out of a review, requested by the 
PM after the UK Presidency in the first half of 1998, of both the substance of UK 
positions on various policies and the general approach to Europe and how these might be 
improved.  It concentrated on isolating the issues that the UK could take the lead on and 
the strategy and tactics to be employed. The review recognised the need for the UK to be 
more positive and pro-active in Europe and thus more able to shape EU agenda setting at 
an early stage. Closer engagement on European issues with other member states and EU 
personnel was seen as critical to doing this. The step change project envisaged a ten-year 
programme for shifting the UK’s position on Europe and other member state’s perception 
of it. This networking offensive had two main foci for relationship building. First, 
between UK ministers and officials and their counterparts in member states. Recognising 
that formal relations between Germany and France had, since the 1963 Elysee Treaty, 
been the cornerstone of the development of EC/EU, it was felt that UK needed to 
similarly court closer ties with partners. This applied to all member states but especially 
Germany, France, Italy, Spain and the Netherlands as well as the candidate states and 
particularly Poland as the largest and most significant of these. Initiatives under this 
programme included regularised Blair/Schroder and Blair/Chirac summits and large set 
piece meetings to discuss an area of mutual policy interest such as the Anglo-French 
meeting at St Malo on European defence policy. The second focus of attention was the 
relationships between ministers and their party contacts on the centre left in Europe. 
These initiatives were complemented by a project to help shape UK public opinion by  15 
encouraging more dissemination of information on the EU, counteracting mis-
information, and publicly campaigning on EU issues.  
 
Of these initiatives, the contacts with member state personnel were seen as the most 
important avenue for development. To assist in this activity the Bi-lateral department of 
the European Union Division in the FCO was created and this took over responsibility for 
all the member state embassies and diplomatic posts from the West European 
Department. Thus for the first time all things European were brought within the same 
command structure. The objective of changing public attitudes involved giving a higher 
profile and larger campaigning role to the position of Minister of State Europe in the 
FCO and the creation of a Public Diplomacy Unit in its EU (Internal) department. This 
unit was also given the task of monitoring the bilateral contacts programme. The whole 
effort was and is overseen by an  inter-departmental committee, MINECOR, chaired by 
the Minister of State Europe, which draws together all the Departmental ministers 
responsible for Europe plus the Europe ministers from the devolved administrations. The 
committee meets about once every six weeks and amongst other matters examines the 
progress of the bi-lateral contacts programme. It reports directly to the Prime Minister.  
 
The Step Change programme did not address the issue of how best to ensure a strategic 
approach to Europe. Unlike previous administrations the Blair administration was not 
deeply divided over Europe so overall European strategy questions could be drawn 
together at the ministerial level. Initially this seems to have been largely handled through 
ad hoc meetings involving the Prime Minister and his EU advisers and the Foreign 
Secretary and other relevant ministers. It was not significantly developed in the Cabinet’s 
European Policy (EP) Committee chaired by the Foreign Secretary. However, the need to 
prepare for an eventual decision and possible actions on UK’s approach to the EURO led 
to the creation in June 2003 of a cabinet committee on European Strategy (EUS). This is 
chaired by the Prime Minister and serviced by the Economic and Domestic Affairs 
Secretariat. Its remit is “to oversee the Government's European strategy, including 
preparations for UK entry into the single currency, progress on the inter-governmental 
Conference on the future of Europe and the presentation of the Government’s European 
policy”. Of course the committee was also created to draw the EURO policy out of the 
closed confines of the Treasury and the Chancellor of the Exchequer  
 
Clearly these changes in institutional opportunity structures reflected the internal 
dynamics of the government. But there was a significant Europeanising effect in the 
recognition that the UK was failing to fully exploit the opportunities available to it to 
shape policy at an early stage. This direct Europeanising effect was engaged in primarily 
to improve the projection side of the UK's approach to Europe.  
 
Labour’s more directive, strategic and proactive approach reflected changes in political 
and organisational cultures which in part enabled these new initiatives to be undertaken 
and which in part were shaped by them. The most important change was in the attitudes 
and values of the governing party and its leadership group. Labour was more at ease with 
the concept of European integration than any government since Heath’s in the early 
1970s. Labour approach to Europe involved both diagnosis and prognosis. It’s perception  16 
of the UK in Europe over the last thirty years was one of missed opportunities, lack of 
understanding, a tendency to follow rather than lead, and a cautious and laggardly 
response to initiatives. Blair summed it up as “hesitation, alienation, incomprehension” 
with a tendency to “hang-back” and to become a straggler forced to “catch-up” with 
initiatives pushed forward by others (Blair 2000 and 2002). The outcome was that the UK 
was often marginalised and isolated in Europe and appeared as a reluctant partner, 
standing by rather than engaging at the heart of the project. In order to redress this legacy 
Labour aimed to take a much more active and pro-European approach especially on those 
issues which it was in the national interest to pursue. On these it was deemed essential 
that the UK was in the forefront of developing proposals, discussing them with other 
member state governments, forming alliances and taking the lead. The benefits to all of 
more active participation were seen as substantial not least because the UK brought 
something extra to the debate: they offered a bridge between Europe and the USA. This 
more positive, can-do approach to Europe, was reflected in an emphasis on isolating and 
persistently pursuing policy matters where UK is able to drive the agenda forward, as in 
the areas of labour market reform, defence, and asylum. The whole point is to make the 
best of the UK case by avoiding the usual constraints and trying to shift the action to 
safer ground where the UK can take the lead or be up-front in the development of policy.  
 
Notably from the very beginning Labour’s stance has been somewhat contradictory. It is 
based on making a more positive play of those matters in keeping with UK interests and 
potential to act, yet the traditional reluctance to act on many of the key integrationist 
issues remains below the surface. There is still resistance to any moves towards greater 
political integration, the single currency remains a problem, and the tradition of divided 
loyalty between transatlantic ties on the one hand and Europe on the other remains 
fundamental to the UK stance in Europe. So the shift in political values, while substantial 
and significant in some areas, has often seemed presentational in others. Nor has the 
adoption of this more positive, European-aware position been comprehensive across the 
government. Though no ministers have taken voluble Euro-sceptic positions, not all have 
been equally enthusiastic. So far as the shift in values is concerned, within the core the 
Treasury remains problematic. The department had became more EU aware in the mid 
1990s, but outside of a small group of European specialists it still tends not to think 
Europe, or engage very much in Europe. Partly this is explained by the Chancellors 
dominance of domestic policy at the level of micro detail, leaving less time to for him 
and his officials to give attention to the European aspects of the Treasury’s work. 
Certainly the Treasury remains is in terms of values and awareness the least 
Europeanised of the core departments. 
 
So far as administrative culture is concerned there has been one very evident 
Europeanising effect which has helped to change the guidelines and norms pertaining to 
the operation of central government in general. Specifically, the adoption of the European 
Convention of Human Rights into UK law. This has implications for all departments and 
many aspects of government activity. It has also shifted UK law more in line with 
continental European law traditions based on codes, principles and legal rights. 
Conversely it has compromised, at least so far as English and Welsh law is concerned, 
the central and traditional emphasis on case law and civil liberties.      17 
These attempts to re-position the UK government on Europe have led to changes in the 
constellation key actors at the core of UK European policy making. As we have seen the 
office of Prime Minister and the role of his advisers on Europe have been enhanced. The 
increase in the size of COES and the raising of the status of its leading officials and its 
focus on No 10 has extended the Prime Minister’s ability to act on matters European. 
Also Blair’s more executive, almost presidential style has meant that the secretariat has 
been able to speak with more authority to departments. Again this is an addition of 
resource and clout to the already established position of Prime Minister as lead player in 
relation to European policy making. A position which has gradually been evolving over 
the period since the establishment of the European Council in 1976. Also enhanced has 
been the office of Minister of State Europe, but the significance of this post depends upon 
the qualities of the incumbent and their relationship with the Prime Minister. Not all the 
incumbents have had good access to No 10 or have been effective in exploiting the 
opportunities available to them. In addition, the position of cabinet ministers has been 
extended, at least so far as engaging with their European counterparts are concerned. The 
bi-lateral aspect of the Step Change initiative has sought to encourage more regular and 
purposeful interaction on the part of minister and their European counterparts.  
 
Given these changes in position how have these actors responded? Blair certainly began 
well on Europe and has sustained a high EU profile. However, over time the gains of 
increased contact and diplomacy have been compromised by UK reticence over an 
increasing number of key issues such as joining the EURO and the European Convention. 
Most significantly UK support for the US led invasion of Iraq has undermined much of 
the gains made in EU diplomacy and coalition building especially with France and 
Germany. More broadly the bi-lateral offensive at ministerial level was initially skewed 
towards France and Germany with 70 and 88 ministerial visits respectively in the year 
1999 – 2000. In the following year more was done to exploit contacts with Spain and 
Belgium (who held the Presidency). Notably the least active core department in terms of 
ministerial contacts was the Treasury. So the overall picture of the actual exploitation of 
the opportunities envisaged in the step change programme has been patchy. Moreover, 
judging by opinion polls, the attempt to educate the public about the facts of Europe has 
failed to register. Of course, it is essential to recall that the step change initiative is a 10 
year project. In the meantime, if we are to generalise, then it is fair to say that so far there 
significant new opportunities for actors have been created and extra resources put in 
place, but actual delivery has been limited.  
 
The outer circle of policy makers 
Beyond the inner core of UK European policy makers, the key changes have affected 
both organisational cultures and the distribution of formal authority. As far as the 
former is concerned, all departments and government agencies have been asked by the 
Prime Minster to heighten awareness of European issues across all levels and sections. 
This is a continuation of previous initiatives all aimed at mainstreaming Europe across 
central government. There is, however, still no comprehensive overall co-ordinated 
training and induction programme. This facility still tends to be provided in house and 
given the policy area specific nature of European business there are good reasons why it 
should remain so. There is much variation across Departments, but overall the degree of  18 
European awareness is higher. This is in part a product of the slow 'socialising' effect that 
increased involvement with the EU has brought into-play over three decades of 
membership. In part also it is a product of the deliberate post 1997 effort by the Centre to 
inculcate across the board more awareness of matters European. Amongst departments 
that have significantly enhanced their engagement has been the Home Office which 
continues to co-ordinate JHA and has been increasingly drawn in on matters concerning 
immigration, asylum, and organised crime. 
  
The key change in formal authority affecting the outer circle of UK EU policy makers 
has been a change in responsibility for all domestic policies that have a significant EU 
content. Policy development in these areas has, since July 1999, had to accommodate the 
input of the new authorities established in the devolved territories, especially in Wales 
and Scotland. Although relations with the EU are reserved to the UK as the member state 
government, responsibility for implementation of EU requirements falls upon the 
devolveds within their territories. This has been interpreted as requiring that the 
devolveds should be involved in the formulation as well as the implementation of policy. 
This provides the devolved governments with a privileged position in the making of 
national European policy compared with the English regions and regions in other EU 
member states. Arguably this represents a shift of authority from central government. In 
effect the basic structure of the state has been changed creating a potentially more varied 
interpretation of ‘national’ European interests and objectives. The consequences of this 
significant re-ordering of authority is taking time to work through, but is clearly 
significant both in terms of its potential and actual effect.   
 
In effect devolution marks an end of the UK unitary, centralised state. It raises a whole 
series of challenges to the centralised and contained character of the established UK/EU 
policy-making process. In particular,  devolution raises questions about the extent to 
which:- 
•  The greater political diversity it has created will generate political disputes between 
central and devolved executives over European policy.  
•  The extent to which the asymmetric nature of devolution (with differing settlements in 
Scotland and Wales) have made the procedures for handling European policy more 
cumbersome and complex. 
•  The extent to which information sharing has been affected. Have civil servants in 
Cardiff and Edinburgh remained as well connected with their counterparts in 
London?  
•  The extent to which new representational arrangements will be needed for Scotland and 
Wales in Brussels and with UKRep. 
 
These challenges are working their way through. They imply a substantial and significant 
alteration in the way the UK conducts European business. They involve shifts in authority, 
changed veto points and institutional opportunity space, as well as alterations in the 
organisational and political cultures underlying the development of policy. All of these 
changes have opened up new opportunities for the articulation and highlighting of sub-
national interests and for the exercise of agency in further developing the emerging multi-
level character of UK governance.     19 
 
Nevertheless, while the changes brought about by devolution in institutional structures 
seem significant, it remains a moot point at this early stage as to whether, how and when 
the opportunities created by institutional change will be exploited. The potential is there 
but its exact expression remains to be manifested and that depends on a number of factors 
that can be enumerated if not predicted. These include changes in party control at any one 
of Westminster, Edinburgh and Cardiff, and also the emergence of new policy issues with 
different implications for each of the territories of the UK, and unforeseen events. The 
critical change centres on the point that pre-devolution UK European policy making took 
place with a framework of collective responsibility to which ministers were bound. The 
consequence of this was that tensions that undoubtedly existed between the territories 
were sorted out within the central state structure. Under devolved arrangements Scottish 
and Welsh ministers are under greater pressure to make public a distinctive line. In effect 
devolution opens up the process, introduces new arenas and new points of tension and 
conflict. These may generate further tension and more significant further change.  
Devolution has also given the Welsh and Scottish authorities the opportunity to deploy 
resources in order to clarify, articulate and pursue in a focussed way the interests of their 
locality in relation to Europe. Both the Scottish and Welsh authorities have reviewed and 
expanded their representation in Brussels as well as maintaining involvement with and 
access to UKRep (see Bulmer, et al, 2002, chapter 6). So far as developing sub-national 
interests through channels to Whitehall are concerned, continuing involvement in the UK 
policy process offers opportunities to articulate sub-national views in policy 
development. Clearly the opportunities are there but the critical point remains as to how 
and when they will be exploited. So overall the European policy making process in the 
UK has become less self-contained within the central state as a result of devolution. It 
opens up new opportunities for territorial governments to play their hand through 
exploiting both extra-state and intra-state channels.  
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
In general the gradual Europeanisation of central government continued under Labour in 
response to the on-going expansion of EU activity and the natural build up of connections 
and understanding that simply being involved in a political and policy making process 
over a substantial period entails. Now all ministries are involved in diplomacy and go to 
Europe and do business there. Indeed the European dimension of central government is 
absolutely essential to understanding how it now operates (Bulmer and Burch 2000) This 
gradual Europeanisation has had all sorts of side effects. For example, the position of the 
FCO as the 'overseas' ministry has been eroded; doing business in Europe is now a task it 
shares with all others in Whitehall. There remains the odd position of the Treasury, but 
even here there is much more European expertise available even though it is applied 
within an organisational culture that remains inward looking.  So in essence 
Europeanisation has spread further and deeper across government. This has affected both 
the content of policy and the practice of policy making. Under Labour this gradual and 
cumulative pattern of Europeanisation has been accelerated and encouraged by a steady 
push from the top.   20 
 
Beyond the amplification of past trends, there has, however, been a step change in the 
handling and approach to European policy making under Labour. There are two 
dimensions to this. First Labour has been able at ministerial level and throughout 
government to take a more pro-active, directive and strategic approach to Europe. This 
has been possible because, compared with previous administrations, there have been 
fewer deep divisions within the leadership over Europe. Consequently strategic 
considerations concerning Europe have been able to be developed at ministerial level 
across government without deep discord. Under the Major administration, by contrast, 
such matters were avoided for fear of dividing the government. So that strategic thinking 
tended to take place either clandestinely or at official level through various ad hoc 
devices. These devices still exist, but there is more of a ministerial steer and policy 
questions have re-verted back to their domain. The second sense in which there has been 
a step change relates to the structure of policy making. The creation of devolved 
authorities in Scotland and Wales (and in Northern Ireland) has changed the way the UK 
process of European policy making works and the pressures brought to bear upon it. In 
essence the institutional pitch has changed, as have some of the players and the rules of 
play. How this will play out in practice remains to be seen as tricky issues arise and if and 
when political control at the sub-national and national level diverges.  
 
Of course the devolution step reflects domestic changes: notably Labour's domestically 
generated programme of constitutional reform. Though it is noticeable that the multi-
level structure that is emerging in the UK is more in keeping with the pre-dominant 
model of state structures in the EU and chimes with the EU associated idea of a ‘Europe 
of the regions’. Indeed in charting change since 1997, the Europeanising effect is often 
evident but it seems less important than other factors such as constitutional reform, or the 
Blair 'style' of governance. The 'step change', bi-lateral programme contains some 
innovative features which adapt established European ways of working with an emphasis 
on networking and coalition building. Other Europeanising effects are less direct and 
primary, though in all instances they are one of the contributory factors glimpsed in the 
background.  
 
In sum, the machinery, process and the approach to handling Europe has changed, the 
potential for projecting the UK in Europe is greater than ever before, personnel are more 
aware and more engaged, and there is leadership and a strategic vision of the UK's place 
in Europe. If, however, we asked how effective these changes have been in terms of 
beneficial outcomes then it would be harder to argue that there has actually been a step 
change. Admittedly we are looking at a ten year project so it is early to judge. In any case 
measuring the effects of diplomacy and enhanced networking is notoriously difficult. 
Certainly impact on public attitudes to Europe seems to have been marginal. These still 
remain a significant drag on any efforts to pursue an innovative and leading approach in 
Brussels. The veto that has always been applied by a reticent and divided public remains 
intact. Then there is the impact of the Iraq war on all that has been done thus far so far as 
alliances and contacts with EU member state counterparts are concerned, while the euro 
retreat of June 2003 tended to confirm the traditional perception of the UK as a reluctant  21 
partner. So, has all this amounted to a step change? In approach – yes. In outcome – at 
least not yet.  
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Figure 1: Europeanization and institutional adaptation 
 
Note: this figure is modified and simplified from Figure 1.1 of Risse, Cowles and 
Caporaso (2001: 6). 
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